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1485 
Foreword 
Introduction to Decentralization and 
Development 
Shitong Qiao† & Richard A. Epstein†† 
On March 14–15, 2017, a group of Asian and American 
scholars working in the areas of law, economics, and political sci-
ence gathered at the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law. 
They debated and discussed decentralization and development 
at a conference cosponsored by New York University’s Classical 
Liberal Institute and the University of Hong Kong Faculty of 
Law’s Centre for Chinese Law. What does decentralization 
mean? How do we best measure decentralization? Is interjuris-
dictional competition a race to the bottom or a race to the top? Is 
decentralization desirable in China or other jurisdictions?  
This symposium contains papers presented at the confer-
ence, in which authors take various approaches to the relation-
ship between decentralization and development: one group of 
scholars takes a universal and theoretical approach; while the 
second group of scholars offers original case studies from China, 
exploring decentralization and its implications on development. 
It is worthwhile to stress at the beginning that these Chinese 
case studies challenge and enrich the general theories on decen-
tralization and development—just as Barry Weingast and 
Yingyi Qian coined the phrase “market-preserving federalism” 
over two decades ago to capture the institutional practices in 
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China.1 In so doing, they triggered a long-lasting debate on fed-
eralism and development.2 We thank the editors of Minnesota 
Law Review for their tremendous partnership and professional 
work in rounding out these symposium pieces for publication. 
Friedrich A. Hayek—the leading classical liberal thinker of 
the twentieth century, whose legacy is still shaping theory and 
practices around the world—is the main inspiration of this sym-
posium. According to Hayek, 
If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of 
rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time 
and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be 
left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know 
directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately avail-
able to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will be solved 
by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, 
after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by 
some form of decentralization.3 
The first question we should ask is what decentralization 
means. Decentralization can happen in many different contexts. 
It can happen between the state and individuals, such as decen-
tralizing land-use decisions to individual property owners;4 be-
tween the state and market entities, a prime example of which 
is the delegation of legal institution building by the Chinese cen-
 
 1. See Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Mar-
ket-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 
1 (1995); Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism as a Commitment to 
Preserving Market Incentives, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 83 (1997) (offering a second-
generation economic theory of federalism). 
 2. See, e.g., Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The Po-
litical Basis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50, 56 (1995); 
Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Develop-
ment, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 1105 (2011). For a critique of market-pre-
serving federalism, see generally Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Did Govern-
ment Decentralization Cause China’s Economic Miracle?, 58 WORLD POL. 505 
(2006); Lizhi Liu & Barry R. Weingast, Taobao, Federalism, and the Emergence 
of Law, Chinese Style, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1563, 1569–73 (2018); Xiaobo Lü & 
Pierre F. Landry, Show Me the Money: Interjurisdiction Political Competition 
and Fiscal Extraction in China, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 706 (2014); Jonathan 
Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1521 (1997); Xiangyu Shi & Tianyang Xi, Race to Safety: Political Compe-
tition, Neighborhood Effects, and Coal Mine Deaths in China, 131 J. DEV. ECON. 
79 (2018). 
 3. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. 
REV. 519, 524 (1945) (emphasis added).  
 4. See Richard A. Epstein, Positive and Negative Externalities in Real Es-
tate Development, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1493 (2018). 
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tral government to Taobao, the biggest online commercial plat-
form in the world;5 and between different levels of government.6 
Richard Epstein addresses the relationship between decen-
tralization and development in the context of land-use law and 
offers a conceptual explanation of how to make sound land-use 
development decisions in the face of the pervasive positive and 
negative externalities from a comparative perspective, with spe-
cial emphasis on English and American law.7 How should com-
mon interests in high-population-density regions be coordi-
nated? One approach is top down, where centralized state 
authorities make the allocative decisions. The alternative ap-
proach is decentralized decision-making. Epstein argues that 
the state should simply set and enforce boundaries between 
strangers, and let multiple parties decide privately whether to 
pool or to separate their activities.8 Starting with the single-
owner paradigm, in which no externalities are possible, and 
moving to discussions on zoning and affordable housing man-
dates, Epstein explains why a system of decentralized property 
rights and private regulations controls most of the negative ex-
ternalities while capturing most of the positive externalities.9 
Lizhi Liu and Barry Weingast move forward from “federal-
ism, Chinese style” to “law, Chinese style,” by which they mean 
private actors devising new institutional rules in China.10 In a 
country with neither Western-style democracy nor an independ-
ent judiciary, they explore the best way of achieving credible 
commitments in market transactions—and the role being played 
by a private technology firm. Taobao is China’s dominant online 
trading platform, with over four hundred million users. It “is not 
simply an exchange platform, but one in the process of develop-
 
 5. See Liu & Weingast, supra note 2. 
 6. See Yun-chien Chang & Ke Xu, Decentralized and Anomalous Interpre-
tation of Chinese Private Law: Understanding a Bureaucratic and Political Ju-
dicial System, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1527 (2018); Kevin E. Davis, Data and Decen-
tralization: Measuring the Performance of Legal Institutions in Multilevel 
Systems of Governance, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1621 (2018); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & 
Shitong Qiao, Binding Leviathan: Credible Commitment in an Authoritarian 
Regime, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1593 (2018); Shitong Qiao, Rights-Weakening Fed-
eralism, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1673 (2018); Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Decentraliza-
tion, and Development, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1651 (2018). 
 7. Epstein, supra note 4. 
 8. Id. at 1494. 
 9. Id. at 1524–25. 
 10. Liu & Weingast, supra note 2, at 1574–76. 
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ing a modern legal system that enforces contracts, resolves dis-
putes, and prevents fraud.”11 Liu and Weingast argue that “de-
velopment of law, Chinese style, parallels previous instances 
where the central government delegated reform authority dur-
ing the reform period from the early 1980s through the early 
1990s.”12 Moreover, the emergence of Taobao’s national market 
overcomes internal trade barriers, an inherent problem with 
market-preserving federalism that has been raised by scholars.13 
Other scholars examine decentralization in the context of al-
location of authority between different levels of government. 
Kevin Davis points to the difficulty in measuring the perfor-
mance of legal institutions in multilevel systems of governance, 
which, in turn, likely affects the accountability and responsive-
ness of the institutions being measured.14 Davis focuses espe-
cially on the challenges to producing indicators that isolate the 
performance of individual legal institutions, particularly subna-
tional institutions.15 These challenges come from main sources: 
one is that governance outcomes are determined jointly by mul-
tilevel institutions instead of institutions operating at a single 
level; the other is the lack of interest by suppliers of such meas-
urement indicators.16 Davis argues that while “there are several 
examples of legal performance measures that cover subnational 
territories,” those indicators are “not . . . good measures of the 
performance of any particular subnational legal institution.”17 In 
a broader sense, Davis points to the complication of decentrali-
zation and the potential tragedy of the regulatory commons in 
multilevel governance. 
One natural appeal of a decentralized system is that indi-
viduals are able to vote by foot. Albert O. Hirschman’s classical 
book Exit, Voice and Loyalty raises the ever-intriguing trade-off 
between exit and voice.18 Following his previous work criticizing 
 
 11. Id. at 1565. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Rodden & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2.  
 14. See generally GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH 
CLASSIFICATION AND RANKINGS (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012); THE QUIET 
POWER OF INDICATORS: MEASURING GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, AND RULE OF 
LAW (Sally Engle Merry, Kevin E. Davis, & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2015). 
 15. Davis, supra note 6, at 1623. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1633. 
 18. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DE-
CLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1972). 
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ballot voting,19 Ilya Somin argues that “the best way to create 
new development is to facilitate foot voting by decentralizing po-
litical power and breaking down obstacles to mobility.”20 He ar-
gues that foot voting promotes development both in a federal sys-
tem and across international boundaries.21 More specifically, 
Somin argues that migration can enable effective exploitation of 
“place premiums”—situations where a given individual is likely 
to be more productive in one location than another, and explores 
mechanisms that would facilitate foot voting both domestically 
and internationally.22 
In contrast, Roderick Hills and Shitong Qiao continue their 
exploration of the interaction between national and subnational 
governments and the political institutions behind interjurisdic-
tional competition.23 Their symposium paper studies why Chi-
nese local officials, who are subject to frequent transfer by the 
central government, are unable to make a credible commitment 
to any development projects they try to initiate during their 
terms.24 Hills and Qiao describe how the problem of credible 
commitment posed by China’s cadre transfer policy, and, more 
generally, the Chinese Communist Party’s distrust of divided 
power, have led to excessive municipal debt in China. They pro-
pose three new institutional solutions for resolving the credible 
commitment problem of China’s authoritarian regime, including 
using decentralized homevoters instead of centralized institu-
tions as local government monitors.25 
Other participants question whether decentralization is 
necessarily desirable in the first instance. Yun-chien Chang and 
Ke Xu offer one of the very first large-scale empirical studies of 
Chinese judicial decisions to test how local courts apply national 
laws in adjudicating property disputes.26 Their Article points to 
a central question in law and development: whether and how the 
past decades of codification of private law in China—including 
 
 19. See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY 
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 80 (2d ed. 2016). 
 20. Somin, supra note 6, at 1651. 
 21. Id. at 1652. 
 22. Id. at 1653–57. 
 23. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Shitong Qiao, Voice and Exit as Accountability 
Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party?, 
48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158 (2016). 
 24. Hills & Qiao, supra note 6. 
 25. Id. at 1614–19. 
 26. Chang & Xu, supra note 6. 
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contract law, property law, tort law, and the ongoing legislation 
of the civil code—will shape the Chinese economy and society at-
large. They argue that the answer largely depends on how na-
tionally promulgated statutes are interpreted by local Chinese 
courts.27 Their empirical investigation reveals that decentralized 
interpretations follow geographic boundaries, given the power of 
non-legal-institutional constraints that operate within the juris-
dictional boundaries of the thirty-one provincial high courts. 
These anomalous interpretations present no clear patterns and 
create unpredictability that economic actors, especially those 
who seek to operate on a national stage, cannot plan around. 
Chang and Xu argue that decentralized judicial interpretations 
therefore are highly likely to harm economic development in 
China.28 
Finally, Shitong Qiao examines the gap between national 
land laws and local land reforms in China and investigates 
whether interjurisdictional competition protects land rights in 
China.29 His empirical investigation reveals that local govern-
ments take far more land than the national government has au-
thorized.30 These local governments alternatively violate, tweak, 
or challenge the national law. His examination of the impact of 
interjurisdictional competition on the development of local land 
institutions demonstrates that local governments are weakening 
individual land rights in order to attract mobile capital. Qiao 
therefore calls decentralized land reforms in China rights-weak-
ening federalism.31 Qiao further argues that the structure and 
power of local governance—the balance between land and capi-
tal—matters much more than competition per se, so that the 
proper question to ask with respect to interjurisdictional compe-
tition is: Who shapes and benefits from the competition? 
Many of the symposium papers use Chinese institutions as 
case studies, killing two birds with one stone. One key to China’s 
economic development miracle over the past four decades has ar-
guably been decentralization,32 which makes it the perfect juris-
diction for studying decentralization and development. As the 
largest developing country in the world, China is still experienc-
ing ongoing institutional experiments throughout the country. 
 
 27. Id. at 1560–62. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Qiao, supra note 6. 
 30. Id. at 1685. 
 31. Id. at 1675. 
 32. See Xu, supra note 2, at 1081–82. 
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These separate events provide rare opportunities for us to ob-
serve how decentralization works in practice, and it provides a 
stimulus that should trigger further theoretical work on the 
overall process of innovation. Our discussions also reveal useful 
lessons for China’s reform in different spheres of activity, includ-
ing the Internet, land use, the judiciary, and local governance.  
Readers of this symposium will have to make their own 
judgments on whether we have made the debate on decentrali-
zation clearer or muddier. As this symposium demonstrates, de-
centralization can happen in different forms, in different con-
texts, and on different time frames, where the multiplicity of 
outcomes are difficult to measure. The increasingly blurry 
boundaries, competition, and interactions between different lev-
els of government also make it hard to evaluate the impact of 
decentralization on development. Individual or decentralized de-
cisions often have wide-ranging impacts on the whole system.33 
As Hayek wrote immediately following the paragraph cited at 
the beginning of this Foreword: 
[Decentralization] answers only part of our problem. We need decen-
tralization because only thus can we ensure that the knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used. But 
the “man on the spot” cannot decide solely on the basis of his limited 
but intimate knowledge of the facts of his immediate surroundings. 
There still remains the problem of communicating to him such further 
information as he needs to fit his decisions into the whole pattern of 
changes of the larger economic system.34 
Hayek argues that the price system meets this challenge.35 
He is undoubtedly right that the price system solves many prob-
lems, but surely it does not solve all these problems given that 
competitive solutions are not easy to come by for, say, network 
industries or pollution control. But at least some of these prob-
lems are amenable to decentralized solutions, which will have to 
rely heavily on various markets and their accompanying price 
mechanisms to guide and coordinate both private and govern-
ment actors. We hope this symposium will invite scholars to re-
think decentralization and development in today’s ever changing 
political and technological environment. We also hope that this 
collection of papers proves useful to policymakers and other 
 
 33. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An 
Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889 (2013) (organizing a modern accounting of feder-
alism into five observations). 
 34. Hayek, supra note 3, 524–25. 
 35. Id. at 525. 
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practitioners making decisions about the allocation of resources 
and powers in achieving development goals. 
